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Abstract
Online trolling is typically studied in the IS literature
as an uncoordinated, anarchic activity. Coordinated,
strategic online trolling is not well understood despite
its prevalence on social media. To shed light on this
prevailing activity, the present study examines the
proposition that coordinated online trolling is timed to
leverage macro societal unrest. In testing this
proposition, we analyzed the dynamics of the Russian
State’s coordinated trolling campaign against the
United States beginning in 2015. Using the May 2018
release of all Russian Troll Facebook advertisements,
this study constructs a topic model of the content of
these ads. The relationship between ad topics and the
frequency of Black Lives Matter protests is examined.
We argue that the frequency of Black Lives Matter
protests proxies for civil unrest and divisiveness in the
United States. The study finds that Russian ads related
to police brutality were issued to coincide with periods
of higher unrest. This work also finds that during
periods of relative calm (evidenced by lower frequency
of protests) Russian ads were relatively innocuous.

1. Introduction
Online trolling is prevalent on social platforms. While
academicians have produced scattered definitions of
online trolling, the provenance of the term is such that
the articulation of a stable and generally accepted
definition may remain elusive. One definition states
that online trolling is “the practice of behaving in a
deceptive, destructive or disruptive manner in a social
setting on the internet with no apparent instrumental
purpose” [2, p. 97]. This definition implies that trolling
is inherently anarchic. However, the trolling
referenced in this study were well coordinated and had
very specific, non-anarchic goals.
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In a January 6th 2017 Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA) [1], it was announced that the
United States intelligence community, in a rare and
unanimous opinion, believed that the Russian
government attempted to interfere with the United
States presidential election and electoral process. The
report, ICA 2017-01D, is a coordinated assessment
involving intelligence information collected by The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and The National
Security Agency (NSA). It is important to note that the
report does not cover the effects of any purported
activity by Russian state and state-sponsored actors,
but describes that activity. At the time of the
assessment, the intelligence community had sufficient
evidence to report that “Russia used trolls as… part of
its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton.
This effort amplified stories on scandals about
Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the
election campaign” [1, p. 4]. According the ICA, a St.
Petersburg based entity, “Internet Research Agency,”
(IRA) described in the report as consisting primarily
of professional trolls spear-headed this effort.
Since the publication of ICA 2017-01D, additional
details regarding Russian state and state-sponsored
activities to subvert ordinary democratic processes in
the United States have been released with increasing
specificity. The U.S. Congress, in the final months of
2017, released a list of 2,752 (since deactivated and
scrubbed) Twitter handles that Twitter Inc. flagged as
emanating from Russia’s Internet Research Agency.
Shortly after, in February of 2018, the textual content
of thousands of Tweets issued by these accounts is
released. In November of 2017 the House Select
Committee on Intelligence provided the public with a
sample of Facebook advertisements created by the
IRA. Finally, in May of 2018 congress published the
comprehensive list of Facebook advertisements
(3,393) and metadata pertaining to them. An oftencited objective of these trolling campaigns is to sow
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discord in the voting populace by amplifying voices on
different sides of polarizing issues. This is the
“trolling” activity referenced in the ICA. In particular
(and we show this later) the Russian IRA, when
creating Facebook advertisements, homed in on the
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The ICA refers
to a subset of tactics used by Russia as trolling. The
“trolling” activity described in the ICA is a
coordinated activity, planned outside of the targeted
platform, and executed in ordered and strategic
fashion. However, much of the IS literature is focused
on trolling as individual, uncoordinated behaviors for
the amusement of the individual perpetrators [3].
Coordinated, strategic online trolling is not well
understood. This research addresses the gap in
academic coverage of online trolling where a central
actor coordinates the activity of multiple virtual
personas and entities.
This study aims to shed light on coordinated and nonanarchic online trolling. To do so, we examine the
commonly held view that Russian troll activity is
(Russian trolls continue to be very active) intended to
sow discord within the American voting public. We
analyze over 3,000 individual PDF documents
published by the Minority in the House Intelligence
Committee where each document corresponds to a
single IRA ad buy. We describe the challenges in
analyzing the data given its published format. We
combine this data into a time series with the only
publicly available collection of Black Lives Matter
movement related protests. Using this novel dataset,
we examine the strategy of IRA ad buys, testing the
conventional wisdom that these buys were intended to
sow discord.

2. Literature
The present study is amongst the first attempts by
academic researchers to systematically make sense of
the strategy employed by the Internet Research
Agency in its “trolling” activities. In our context,
extant work on Internet trolling can be divided into
two categories: (i) individualistic, and (ii) coordinated.
While the majority of Internet trolling research falls
into the first category, a small but burgeoning stream
of research is emerging with respect to the second
category. An online trolling study is individualistic
when it implicitly or explicitly assumes the Buckels et
al. definition of online trolling. That is, “the practice
of behaving in a deceptive, destructive or disruptive
manner in a social setting on the internet with no
apparent instrumental purpose” [2]. An online trolling
study is coordinated if it examines strategic efforts,

undertaken by a group, to use social media platforms
for subversive acts.
While the Buckels et al. definition does not explicitly
rule out online trolling as a coordinated activity,
studies employing this definition view online trolling
as anteceded by individual nuance or as a
manifestation of social practices [3]. Within the
individualistic view of trolling several causal
attributions have been proffered accounting for the
behavior of individual trolls. In a study into the
behavior of trolls on Wikipedia, [4] found that trolls
repeatedly engage in intentional, harmful actions
online, that they actively violate the terms of service
on the platforms that they use, and that they work in
isolation often with obfuscated virtual identities. That
study attributes these behaviors to boredom, fun,
vindictiveness and masochistic self-fulfillment. [5]
identifies sexism/racism, grieving and misleading as
intentional trolling behaviors on video game
platforms. The individual-level antecedents to trolling
reported in [5] comport with those in [4]. Another
study finds a strong positive relationship between
trolling behavior and a sadistic personality profile [6]
while [7] find that individuals’ moods predict troll
behavior. Some studies focus on trolling as both
individual-level and coordinated activity [3], [8].
The second theme, coordinated online trolling, is
relatively nascent and heavily skewed towards
Russian activities in the Occident and in Ukraine.
Studies in the domain have examined retweet
networks stemming from Russian IRA trolls finding
that IRA trolls on twitter were vastly more popular
amongst conservatives than liberals (with respect to
the US) [9] that troll content did not travel far beyond
Twitter, that discussion topics produced by the trolls
was event-specific [10] and designed to be polarizing
by tweeting in favor of “both sides” of a divisive issue
[11]. In some cases, these trolls have been shown to be
aggressive, targeting particular social media users and
topics such that those users are dissuaded from
engaging with those topics [12]. Most of the published
empirical studies examining coordinated, strategic
online trolling rely on data from Twitter. Russian IRU
use of Facebook for trolling activities has not been
examined. Further, there are no studies linking
Russian IRU trolling activities with real world events.
Consequently, little is known regarding the strategic
deployment of trolls to: (1) exploit real world events
to enhance messaging and trolling efficacy, and (2)
potentially effect real world events. In addition,
existing research into online trolling in general and
coordinated trolling by the Russian IRA in particular
has not examined the strategic timing of coordinated
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troll content. To fill this gap in literature, we will
analyze the relationship between Russian IRA
Facebook advertisment topics and the prevailing
social context around the time that those topics were
broached. To do so, we construct a novel dataset that
joins detailed Russian IRA Facebook advertisement
data with a Black Lives Matter (BLM) protest dataset.
The result is a time series consisting of both themes.

3. Data Collection
We noted that US House Democrats on the House
Intelligence Committee released the full text as well as
metadata associated with 3,393 promoted Facebook
posts (advertisements). The release comprised of
3,393 individual semi-structured PDF documents.
House staff appear to have scanned printed copies into
PDF format; the data is embedded with the documents
as images. The format of the data release, accordingly,
posed a challenge for analysis. Using a Java API for
Tesseract OCR (Optical Character Recognition) in
concert with Oracle’s PDFBox API we automated a
pipeline that traverses each PDF document and applies
OCR to the primary image embedded within the first
page of the document.
The documents follow a standard format where the
first page contains fields regarding the content timing
and other metadata germane to the advertisement. The
second page is the actual rendition of the advert as it
would have been shown to users. We do not make use
of the second page. Once an image is successfully
extracted from a PDF, the Tesseract OCR API is used
to extract legible text. The pipeline ends with the
application of heuristics to extract data from relevant
fields for structured analysis. Tesseract OCR
successfully extracted 2,471 ads of the original
collection of 3,393. To inspect the accuracy of the
OCR process we randomly sampled 30 ads from the
collection. The OCR classifier did not significantly
misclassify characters in any of the sampled
advertisements.
We also collected a dataset of 1,921 Black Lives
Matter related protests and demonstrations from
August 2014 through to May 2018. The dataset was
crowd sourced on http://elephrame.com, a site
dedicated to tracking these demonstrations. Below, we
chart the count of BLM protests by quarter. The
second half of 2016 saw a massive uptick in the count
of protests.

Figure 1. Count of Protests by Quarter
Below we chart the count of IRA advertisements by
quarter. Comparing the chart below with the chart
above, there is an unmistakable alignment between the
protests and IRA ad buys on Facebook. Indeed, a
lagged relationship. Below, the IRA ramped up its ad
buying activity in the second half of 2016 in general,
and in the fourth quarter in particular. Whereas BLM
protests ramped up in the third quarter of 2016, the
IRA appears to have acted in the following quarter,
sustaining that action into 2017. Clearly, there is a
need to systematically confirm this relationship.

Figure 2. Count of Ads by Quarter
Each event recorded on http://elephrame.com is
supported by a reputable news source, identified by a
URL. As before, we randomly selected 30 protests
from the dataset and found that all events in the sample
were verifiable and correct. As the site did not provide
a mechanism to download the collection, we
automated the traversal of the site’s pages to collect
the comprehensive list. Once the comprehensive list
was established, we merged both datasets into an SQL
database for analysis.
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indicating the importance of a term to a document
given the distribution of that term over all documents
in the corpus. The TF-IDF matrix becomes the input,
V, to the NMF model.

Figure 3. Sample Page 1

Figure 4. Sample Page 2

4. Topic Model
Using the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF)
implementation in the Python Scikit-Learn library, we
construct a topic model from the text of the
advertisements. NMF is a popular decomposition
technique for multivariate data where given a nonnegative input matrix, V, two non-negative matrix
factors are found, W and H such that their product
approximates V [13]. NMF begins with an n x m
matrix, V, where m is the number of observations in
the data and n is the number of “features”. The V
matrix is factorized into an n x r matrix, W, and an r x
m matrix, H, where r is an input parameter specified to
be lower than m or n [13]. In this way, NMF can be
used to find low rank approximations of the input V
matrix.
In its application as a text mining technique, NMF can
be used in document summarization or topic
modelling when applied over a corpus of text
documents. The textual input must be converted into a
matrix representation; we elect to use a weighted
representation of terms within documents by
performing the term frequency dot product inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF) transformation over a
term frequency matrix. The result is a matrix the axes
of which represent documents and terms, with fields

After removing stop words from the text of the
Russian IRA Facebook advertisements, we generate a
term frequency matrix over the documents limiting the
number of terms to 1000. This matrix is subsequently
transformed into a TF-IDF matrix prior to nonnegative matrix factorization. The number of topics to
be extracted, r, is set to 10. The table below illustrates
the results of our topic model. For each topic we list
the top 10 weighted terms obtained from the W factor
matrix. Using these terms and analyzing the
underlying advertisement text, we developed labels for
the topics.
Topi
c
Tokens (n=10)
Label
black
matters
community
join
people proud lives
blackmattersus
tp1
matter life
Black Lives Matter
2nd
amendment
patriots lovers guns
supporters
defend
community
join
tp2
priority
2nd Amendment
self defense free feel
safe class event Self
Defense
tp3
friends bring join
Training
repost women 22
powerful melanin let
30 different day
tp4
choose
Misc/Unknown
com https follow
facebook
channel
twitter
awww
instagram
www
tp5
youtube
Follow Request
police bm brutality
man officer cop cops
tp6
video officers shot
Police Brutality
stop refugees news
latest jobs home
taking real problem
tp7
islamophobia
Immigration
blacklivesmatter
blackandproud
blackexcellence
blackpride blacklove
education
economicempowerm
tp8
ent
BLM Hashtags
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𝑌𝑡−𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡

unapologeticallyafri
can
unapologeticallyblac
k knowledgeofself

𝑚+2

+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑗=2

veterans
support
brave
come
govspending
usa
learn clinton click
tp9
priority
Misc/Unknown
like join social issues
immigration illegal
agree racial looks
tp10 beat
Misc/Unknown
Table 1. Top 10 Topic Tokens and their Labels

5. Model Specification and Results
Given that existing research into online trolling in
general and coordinated trolling by the Russian IRA in
particular has not examined the strategic timing of
coordinated troll content, this study poses the
following questions: (1) are Russian IRA Facebook
ads timed to coincide with polarizing events, and (2)
how does the content of Russian IRA Facebook ads
change to reflect strategic behavior in response to
polarizing events. To glean insight into these
questions, we advance the following empirical model:

n =797
Variables
constant
impressions
Black Lives Matter
2nd Amendment
Self Defense Training
Misc/Unknown
Follow Request
Police Brutality
Immigration
BLM Hashtags
Misc/Unknown
Misc/Unknown
Log Likelihood
Pearson Chi-Squared

10

1

Where the dependent variable is a count of protests
between some time t and some other time t – i where i
is denominated in days. Time periods in this model are
daily intervals. In several cases, multiple IRA ads are
introduced in a given day. Accordingly, impressions at
time t is the sum of impressions for all ads introduced
during that time. A topic m at time t is the sum of
scores for topic m across all advertisements introduced
at time t. The model coefficients are estimated using a
Poisson regression to account for the non-negativity of
the count based dependent variable. Impressions, the
count of Facebook users who saw the advertisement is
rescaled using a min-max scaler to account for the
extreme
dispersion
in
impressions;
some
advertisements were never seen while others were
seen millions of times. In the histogram below, the
sum of topic weights across the collection of
advertisements is given. Topics t1 and t6,
corresponding to Black Lives Matter hashtags and
police brutality respectively, are clearly dominant
themes in the corpus. Media reports (see above) reflect
this finding, providing partial support for our topic
model.

i=
0

-10
-1
coef
P>|z|
coef
P>|z|
coef
P>|z|
coef
P>|z|
coef
P>|z|
2.601
0***
1.043
0***
0.353
0***
2.6246 0*** 1.0114
0
-0.006
0.962 -0.389 0.224
-0.126 0.764
0.0882 0.458 -0.0274 0.92
-0.031
0.689 -0.018 0.924
0.205
0.394
0.167 0.017** 0.1614 0.333
0.028
0.482 0.135 0.140
0.232 0.038** 0.0372 0.392 0.1974 0.047**
-0.318 0.003*** -0.965 0.006*** -1.252 0.038** -0.5928 0*** -1.6421 0***
-1.189
0*** -0.902 0.036** -0.530 0.340 -0.9672 0*** -0.8205 0.023**
-0.547
0*** -0.936 0***
-1.755
0***
-0.9065 0***
-1.278 0***
1.024
0***
1.084
0***
1.347
0***
0.9741 0***
1.195
0***
-0.016
0.792 -0.133 0.425
-0.007 0.973
0.1055 0.037** 0.1303 0.234
-0.724
0*** -0.290 0.260
-0.998 0.063 -0.6559 0*** -0.7547 0.017**
0.235 0.007*** 0.107 0.632
0.121
0.695
-0.009 0.928 -0.0011 0.996
-0.249 0.035** -1.765 0.009*** -3.124 0.005*** -0.0625 0.419
-0.09
0.648
-6959.2
2376.6
-1707.3
-7034.9
-2642.9
16700
3960
3960
16500
6020

*** .01 significance level; ** .05 significance level

Table 2. Empirical Results
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advertisements related to police brutality lead to an
uptick in BLM related protest activities. However, the
strong association between BLM protests and police
brutality related advertisements is more likely
suggestive of astute opportunism on the part of the
Russians. It is reasonable to assume that Russian IRA
agents were monitoring Western news for reports of
Black deaths stemming from police encounters.

Figure 5. IRA Advertisement Topics
Below, we present the results of our analysis. We
examine different configurations of the dependent
variable by toggling the size of the date range from
which protest counts are computed. Recalling the
model shown in the formula above, i represents the
outer boundaries of a date range. For instance, if i =
30, then, for a given time period, we are examining a
dependent variable computed as the count of protests
in the 30-day date range prior to the period. Negative
values of i denote a forward looking dependent
variable. For instance, if i = -30, then, for a given time
period, we are examining a dependent variable
computed as the count of protests in the 30-day date
range following the period.
When i = 1 or i = -1 the dependent variable is the count
of BLM protests on and one period before a given
period and, on and one period after a given period
respectively. We construct our time series based on
daily intervals. As such when i = 0 we are examining
protests that occurred on the same day as the creation
of a given advertisement. The results above include
several significant relationships between the count of
BLM protests and the topics of Russian IRA ads.
The police brutality topic is positively and
significantly associated with the occurrence of BLM
protests in all intervals at the .01 level. Indeed, the
coefficient (to be interpreted on a logarithmic scale
due to the log linking function used in a Poisson
regression) values increase the closer i is to 0. This
may indicate that the IRA detected and responded
quickly to domestic unrest regarding police violence.
This finding is supported by recent work [14] showing
that “Black Lives Matter protests are more likely to
occur in localities where more Black people have
previously been killed by police” (p. 400). It is
reasonable to expect, then, that messages amplifying
the killing of Black people by police will be associated
with an uptick in BLM protest activity around the time
of the killing. Our work does not support any causal
inferences. This model cannot show that Russian IRA

With respect to the forward-looking models (where i <
0) we note positive coefficient in the police brutality
topic. The strength of the positive association between
these ads and BLM protests diminishes as the time
interval widens. Again, this does not indicate that IRA
adverts on Facebook caused protests but that upticks
in protest activities as a result of police killings last for
several days. We do, however, assert that this research
demonstrates the need for a carefully crafted causal
study into this matter.
Most topics are negatively associated with BLM
protests. This finding comports with media reports
about the content of the Russian IRA Facebook
advertisements. If it holds that BLM protests proxy for
periods of unrest, then it stands to reason that the
Agency would tend to post inflammatory messages
that coincide with increased protest activity. Our
interpretation of these negative coefficients is as
follows. During ‘quiet’ periods and using the count of
BLM protests in a period as proxy for ‘quietness,’ the
topic composition of IRA ads shifts away from police
brutality. For instance, the self-defense training topic
(tp3) is significantly negatively associated with the
count of BLM protests for all tested values of i. This
indicates that during calm periods, rather than attempt
to inflame, the IRA sought to pass its Facebook
accounts as normal and innocuous.
Given these results, we can proffer the following
responses to our research questions. With respect to
the first research question, “are Russian IRA Facebook
ads timed to coincide with polarizing events” we show
that Russian IRA Facebook ads are carefully timed to
coincide with polarizing events. For our second
research question, “how does the content of Russian
IRA Facebook ads change to reflect strategic behavior
in response to polarizing events”, we show that the
content of Russian IRA Facebook ads became
increasingly inflammatory in response to polarizing
events, but became mundane in response to periods of
relative calm.

6. Limitations
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There are several important limitations to this research
and its findings. One such limitation is causal
inference. The findings here are by no means causal in
nature. This means that we cannot infer from this
model that Russian IRA Facebook advertisements
caused any changes in the frequency of BLM protests
in subsequent periods. Another limitation is the fact
that, at the time of this writing, we have been unable
to extract data from about a quarter of the IRA
advertisements released by the House Select
Committee on Intelligence. While we do not observe
any systematic bias introduced by these missing data
points, we do acknowledge that the effect of the
missing data is largely unknown. Finally, we
acknowledge the fact that the dependent variables,
where i ≠ 0, overlap. We adjust for this by estimating
model coefficients for i = 0 such that, for those
estimates, there is no overlap. A future study will use
known corrections to efficiently estimate a model
under these conditions.

7. Conclusion
Our study shows that the Russian State attempted to
sow discord in the United States via information
warfare, a tactic that has gained popularity in the
Russian intelligence services in recent years [1], [9],
[12]. These activities are a case of coordinated online
trolling. The dynamics of their use of information for
subversive purposes in the United States presents an
opportunity to examine general propositions about the
timing of coordinated trolling activity. The use of
professional trolls in one Internet Research Agency to
strategically subvert normal democratic processes in
the US is bourgeoning area of study. This study
leverages a collection of Russian IRA produced
promoted posts (ads) on Facebook released by
Democrats on the US House Select Committee on
Intelligence in May, 2018. Using data extracted via
OCR from this release, we match advertisements to
BLM protests. To do so, we take advantage of the only
publicly available list of BLM protest activity. We
extract a collection of 10 topics from the text of the
ads. We subsequently develop a model to shed light on
the association between ad topics and protest
activities. We find that ads about police brutality were
positively associated with protest activity by BLM
activists and sympathizers. We also find that ads about
all other topics were negatively associated with protest
activity. These findings allow us to conclude that
Russian IRA trolls were opportunistic, placing ads
timed to coincide with periods of unrest and division
in the United States. We can also conclude that during

times of low protest activity, Russian IRA trolls turned
to more innocuous topics.
This study contributes to the academic and public
understanding of coordinated online troll behavior. It
provides the first (to our knowledge) piece of evidence
that coordinated trolling by foreign entities is a
carefully timed activity. More specifically coordinated
actors have a sense for the general political climate of
the environments that they attack, they likely actively
monitor the information landscape of that environment
and alter their messaging to maximize their effect.
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